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STUDENT COMMENT
THE RULEMAKING PROCEDURE OF THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD: THE BLOCKED
SPACE SERVICE PROBLEM
The Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board or as
the CAB) is charged with the economic regulation of the air transport in-
dustry.' Freight transportation is an increasingly important part of this
industry, and the major carriers have invested large sums in freight opera-
tions.' A 1964 Board actions excluding many carriers from offering blocked
space freight service' has resulted in litigation which has importance not
only for the air transport industry, but, because of the nature of the
questions raised, for all industries subject to intensive regulation by federal
agencies. It is the purpose of this note to examine and comment upon this
litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1962 Congress passed Public Law 87-528, 5
 amending the Federal
Aviation Act," and providing that all air carriers might engage in charter
flights under appropriate Board regulation without regard to restrictions
contained in their certificates of public convenience and necessity.? On
November 13, 1962, the Board issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to
determine what, if any, modification should be made to section 207 of the
Board's economic regulations8 due to Public Law 87-528. After preliminary
investigation, the Board, on January 23, 1964, issued a new notice of proposed
rulemaking entitled "Charter Trips and Special Services; Statements of
General Policy."'
1
 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. $§ 1301-542
(1964).
2 See Brief for Petitioner, p. 5, American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, petition for cert.
filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 3037 (U.S. June 6, 1966) (No. 304).
a 29 Fed. Reg. 11589 (1964).
4
 The Board defined "blocked space service" as follows:
"Blocked space service" means the carriage of property in all-cargo aircraft at
wholesale rates pursuant to an effective tariff stating a rate applicable only when
the user reserves and agrees to pay for a specified amount of space or lift on a
regularly recurring basis for a period of not less than 60 days.
14 C.F.R.	 399.37(a)(2) (1966).
5
 76 Stat. 143 (1962).
0
 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. $§ 1301-542 (1964).
7
 This amendment in effect reversed Board decisions which had held that carriers
not certificated to carry persons could not engage in charter passenger flights. See Charter
Flight Tariff Investigation, 15 C.A.B. 921 (1952), aff'd sub nom. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
v. CAB, 204 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1953). At the end of World War II, these carriers
attempted to take advantage of the anticipated growth in demand for air freight trans-
portation. See generally Air Freight Case, 10 C.A.B. 572 (1949); Domestic Cargo-Mail
Serv. Case, 36 C.A.B. 344 (1962).
8
 14 C.F.R. § 207 (1966). Section 207 regulates charter trips and special services.
9 29 Fed. Reg. 1476 (1964).
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In this statement the Board first proposed to distinguish two classes of
carriers: all-cargo carriers and combination carriers." The Board proposed
different rules with respect to charter flights for the all-cargo carriers than
for the combination carriers." The Board also proposed the following state-
ment of policy:
It is the policy of the Board to permit the all-cargo carriers
to sell blocked space at wholesale rates to such combination carriers
as may choose to do so to provide service between the certificated
points of the combination carrier involved."
Several combination carriers, including petitioners in the principal case, filed
written responses to this proposed rulemaking. On June 22, 1964, the Board
issued a supplemental notice to the proposed rulemaking within which was
the following:
Included in these questions [for oral argument] is the proposal
advanced by certain all-cargo carriers to extend the applicability
of the proposed policy on the sale of blocked space by such carriers
to include sales to air freight forwarders and other large volume
shippers, as well as to combination carriers."
The combination carriers (hereinafter designated as American)" were given
an opportunity to respond to this question on oral argument.
Shortly thereafter, Slick Corporation, an all-cargo carrier, filed a tariff
with the Board which incorporated blocked space service. American objected
to the Slick tariff and filed defensive tariffs." The Board suspended all the
tariffs incorporating blocked space pending an investigation to determine the
lawfulness of such tariffs." On August 7, 1964, the Board issued Policy State-
10 Combination carriers are those carriers holding certificates of public convenience
and necessity authorizing the transportation of persons, property, and mail. All-cargo
carriers are those carriers whose certificates authorize only the transportation of property
and mail.
1 1 The Board proposed that the off-route charters of combination carriers be limited
to 2% of their on-route revenue plane miles per year, and that no more than one-third
of such charters take place in any consecutive three-month period. All-cargo carriers
were to be permitted unlimited off-route charter flights within the area of their certificated
operations. (The area of certificated operations would be either domestic or foreign
service depending upon the carrier.)
12 29 Fed. Reg. 1479 (1964). This proposal involved a pooling arrangement. The
combination carriers would be allowed to reserve space on flights of the all-cargo carriers
and could use that space to transport freight that they might otherwise have had to ship
on their own all-cargo aircraft.
13 29 Fed. Reg. 8121 (1964). This extension is significant in that the proposal no
longer merely involves prospective pooling arrangements among carriers.
14 American Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., and United Air Lines, Inc.
were the combination carriers who pursued the litigation through the courts.
15 A "tariff" is a schedule of rates for the transportation of goods. It is open for
public inspection, and the rates stated are those currently charged by the carrier pub-
lishing the tariff. A defensive tariff is a tariff similar to the flied tariff of a competitor.
The purpose of the defensive filing is to permit competition on even terms in the event
the competitor's tariff becomes effective.
16 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 1002(g), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. 1482(g) (1964).
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ment 24," stating that it would be the policy of the Board to permit only
all-cargo carriers to offer blocked space service. At the same time the Board
lifted its suspension of the Slick tariff, but continued the investigation." On
August 11, 1964, the Board summarily rejected the blocked space tariffs
offered by the combination carriers because their tariffs were inconsistent
with the Board's regulations, that is, inconsistent with Policy Statement 24."
The combination carriers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
IL THE LITIGATION TO DATE
Before a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, American argued that
the Board had improperly revoked outstanding authority which American
had under its certificate of public convenience and necessity." This argu-
ment may be summarized as follows. When the Board lifted its suspension of
the Slick blocked space tariff, it admitted that Slick had authority to file such
a tariff. Since the certificates of Slick and American are identical insofar as
they provide authority to transport property and mail, the subsequent sum-
mary rejection of the American blocked space tariff effected a revocation of
American's authority to file such a tariff. This action was taken without
providing American with the adjudicatory (adversary) hearing" required by
the FAA22
 for the modification of existing certificates, and was therefore
invalid. American also argued that the Board, in discriminating between
Slick and American, had violated the fundamental ratemaking principle of
affording competitors equal opportunities.
The Board relied on its broad powers to regulate the air transport indus-
try, citing section 416 of the FAA" as authority for distinguishing all-cargo
from combination carriers, and contended that Policy Statement 24 was
properly within the scope of rulemaking as defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act; 24 therefore the Board was not required to hold an adjudica-
tory hearing. In addition, the Board stated that American had been accorded
more than minimum opportunities to respond to the proposed rulemaking.
The court's decision 25 was 2-1 in favor of American, and the Board petitioned
for a rehearing en banc. The petition was granted and the case came before
the full court of appeals.
In a 5-3 decision, the court of appeals upheld the Board." The court
17
 29 Fed. Reg. 11589 (1964).
18 CAB Order E-21160, August 7, 1964.
19 29 Fed. Reg. 11729 (1964).
20 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 17 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
This authority exists by virtue of certificates issued under the statutory "grandfather"
provision. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 401(e)(1), 52 Stat. 988.
21 The principal difference between rulemaking and an adjudicatory hearing is that
in the latter, American would be entitled to cross-examine opposing witnesses. In addi-
tion, American would have been informed from the outset of the purpose of the pro-
ceedings.
22 72 Stat. 756 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964).
23 72 Stat. 771 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1964).
24 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S,C. § 1001(c) (1964).
25
 Supra note 20.
26 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane).
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held that the Board has power to pass the regulation, was not required to
hold an adjudicatory hearing, and correctly followed APA rulemaking proce-
dures. General notions of fairness, the court ruled, do not require that
American be given any fuller hearings by the Board. The dissent argued that
the Board's action was a modification of American's certificate authority, and
therefore American was entitled to an adjudicatory hearing. In addition, the
dissent indirectly questioned the Board's power to adopt the regulation.
The court quickly disposed of two major issues in the case: whether the
Board has the authority to effectuate its blocked space policy, and whether,
in formulating the policy, the Board correctly followed rulemaking proce-
dures. This'lack of emphasis is unwarranted, for these issues are not open and
shut, and if the court is incorrect on these questions there is little point in
deciding that American was not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing.
The FAA provides two distinct functions from which the Board may
derive authority for its blocked space policy: the rate-regulating function,
and the licensing function.27
 Since blocked space tariffs, like ordinary tariffs,
are simply a schedule of rates for the transportation of goods, and since the
Board chose to implement its policy through the rejection of tariffs, the
Board's blocked space policy may properly be viewed as an exercise of its
rate-regulating function.
Section 403 of the FAA23
 requires carriers to file tariffs with the Board
and to observe these tariffs in their operations. The Board is permitted to
reject tariffs that do not comply with Board regulations prescribing the con-
tents, form, and manner of filing and publishing tariffs. 20 Section 1002(d) 30
permits the Board to prescribe replacement rates and fares if the Board finds,
after appropriate hearings, that the rates or fares charged by a carrier are
"or will be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial .. . ."31 Section 1002(g) 92 permits the
Board to suspend proposed tariff changes for a limited period, "and after
hearing . . . the Board may make such order with reference thereto as would
be proper in a proceeding instituted after such rate [or] . . . fare . . . had
become effective."" In the absence of any Board action, or, following the
period of suspension if the Board has taken no further action, any tariff filed,
with the Board will be effective 3a
Thus, the Board has limited power to regulate rates. The FAA permits
27 In order to operate in the air transport industry carriers are required to obtain a
certificate from the Board. The certificate will indicate the routes over which the carrier
may operate, whether the carrier may carry passengers in addition to cargo and mail,
and any other limitations on operating authority which the Board finds to be required
by the public interest. Actions with respect to issuing or amending certificates comprise
the Board's licensing function. A separate function, the rate-regulating function, is com-
prised of Board powers over the regulation of tariffs.
28
 72 Stat. 758 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964).
29 Ibid.
80
 72 Stat. 789 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1964).
81 Ibid.
82





the Board only two rate-regulating remedies: rejection, and prescription of
replacement rates. Rejection is limited to tariffs not filed in accordance with
the procedures prescribed by the Board. Prescription of a replacement rate,
rather than rejection, is the Board's remedy for any tariff which the Board
may find to violate the standards of section 1002(d)." Neither of these
remedies provides a basis for the implementation of the Board's blocked
space policy. The Board rejected the American tariff not for inadequacies in
filing procedure but for inconsistency with the Board's Policy Statement, a
basis for rejection not authorized by the FAA. Neither did the Board's find-
ings in adopting the Policy Statement constitute findings that an American
blocked space tariff would violate the standards of section 1002(d)." It is
submitted that the Board could not make such findings with respect to a
combination carrier and still permit an all-cargo carrier to offer the service,
for the standards of section 1002(d) 37 look to the effects of a given tariff
upon the users of the service, effects which will not vary depending upon
whether the carrier offering the service is all-cargo or combination. As an
exercise of its rate-regulating function, the Board's blocked space policy is
without statutory support.
If, then, the Board is to find a basis for its blocked space policy, it must
do so in terms of its licensing function. Section 401(e) (1) of the FAA" pro-
vides that "there shall be attached to the exercise of the privileges granted
by the certificate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable terms, conditions,
and limitations as the public interest may require."" Section 401(g) permits
the Board to amend or modify any certificate "if the public convenience and
necessity so require," but this amending may only be done "after notice and
hearings!"° These powers would comprehend amendments to carriers' certifi-
cates excluding carriers from offering blocked space service. But it is only if
the Board has properly classified the carriers that classification can be the
basis for determining which carriers' certificates shall be modified.
The Board's authority to classify carriers derives from section 416(a) of
the FAA," which requires that classifications be just, reasonable, and con-
sistent with the other provisions of the FAA. It further requires classifications
to be founded on differences in the nature of the services performed by the
carriers so classified. By the terms of their certificates, Slick and American
were obligated to provide identical cargo services. 42 The nonexistence of any
difference between the two carriers' cargo services means that the Board's
classification lacks a fundamental element of the statutory requirement. The
general powers and duties given to the Board by section 20443 do not obviate
the necessity to observe the requirements of other sections of the FAA, for
35 72 Stat. 789 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1964).
36 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 72 Stat. 755 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1964).
39 Ibid.
4° 72 Stat. 756 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964).
41 72 Stat. 771 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(a) (1964).
42 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1964).
43 72 Stat. 743 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1964).
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section 204 explicitly requires the Board to act "pursuant to and consistent
with the provisions of this chapter . . ."
The court disposed of the problems so far raised in the following passage:
That competitors in a regulated industry should be treated similarly
in rate rulings in order to preserve competition is not denied. But
that is not to say that reasonable distinctions between groups of
competitors are impermissible, and that different services and rates
may not then be authorized for the different groups or classes. Con-
gress made a broad delegation of power to the Board, in § 416(a)
of the Act ... , to "establish such just and reasonable classifications
or groups of air carriers . . . as the nature of the services performed
by such air carriers shall require."
Petitioners have made no presentation that the Board's distinc-
tion between combination carriers and all-cargo carriers is mean-
ingless or without rational foundation. Congress has given the Board
not only a wide regulatory authority, but a specific promotional
function to initiate proposals for the purpose of expanding efficient
civil aviation transport; the power to classify carriers and service;
and the power to issue implementing rules and regulations. This
combination of powers, together with the underlying findings and
conclusions, suffices to sustain the regulation on the merits, assum-
ing no procedural bar." (Footnotes omitted.)
As authority for this holding the court cited United States v. Storer Broad-
casting Co." and NBC v. United States." Neither of these cases support the
result reached by the court. In Storer, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion determined that ownership by one party of more than a fixed number of
stations was not in the public interest. In NBC, the Federal Communications
Commission proscribed certain chain broadcasting arrangements. Neither
case involved ratemaking, and in both cases the regulations determined
standards to be applied to future license applications or license renewals,
unlike the Board's policy which affects existing licenses.
The court drew support for its holding from American's failure to attack
the Board's classification as "meaningless or without rational foundation."'"
It is not surprising that American did not choose to so attack the Board's
classification, for the test proposed by the court bears little relation to the
actual statutory test for classification. Under the FAA, a classification must
be just and reasonable and based on the nature of the services performed by
the carriers."
The other major issue inadequately treated by the court is the issue of
whether the Board correctly followed rulemaking procedures. The court
stated that "the procedure followed by the Board admittedly complies fully
with the requirements for rule making established in section 4 of the
44 359 F.2d at 627-28.
46 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
46 319 US. 190 (1943).
47 359 F.2d at 627.
48 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 416(a), 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. § 1386(a) (1964).
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Administrative Procedure Act . . . ." 49
 Section 4 of the APA" does set out
the requirements for rulemaking: general notice must be given and this notice
must include reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed, and
must state either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved. After notice, an opportunity must be afforded
interested parties to participate in the rulemaking through the submission of
written data or arguments, with or without the opportuniy to make oral pre-
sentations. These requirements do not usually apply to policy statements, but
once the Board gave Policy Statement 24 a substantive effect by basing a
tariff rejection on failure to comply with its terms, the character of the Policy
Statement changed; it became a substantive regulation to which the foregoing
requirements do apply.
The first notice from the Board concerned possible modification of
charter flight regulations and did not mention either policy or regulations
affecting tariffs over certificated routes. The second notice proposed that a
distinction be made between all-cargo and combination carriers only for the
purpose of regulating charter flights, and that the Board adopt a policy
favoring the sale of blocked space by all-cargo carriers to combination car-
riers. This notice carried no implication that the combination carriers might
be deprived of authority to issue blocked space tariffs. The combination car-
riers did respond in writing to these proposals, but since the exclusionary
nature of the Board's ultimate policy was not yet apparent, neither the Board
nor the court can argue that this constituted the opportunity for comment
contemplated by the APA."
It was not until the Board issued a supplemental notice to the proposed
rulemaking that any exclusionary aspect of the proposed blocked space policy
could be discerned. The Board stated that it would like to hear oral argument
on the question of extending blocked space service by all-cargo carriers to
air freight forwarders and other large volume shippers. Since this question
did not concern sale of blocked space by combination carriers, the latent
exclusionary nature of the Board's policy could only be noted by inference.
Although the combination carriers had opportunity to respond on oral argu-
ment, they did not have opportunity to file written comments, and they were
limited to oblique attacks upon the exclusionary policy, since prior to its
adoption the final form of the policy was never presented for public comment.
The procedure followed by the Board raises a substantial question whether
American has "been accorded a hearing conforming to and surpassing the
minimum required for rule making," 52
 as was held by the court.
The only issue discussed in any detail by the appellate court is whether
the Board was required to hold an adjudicatory hearing before effectuating
its policy. American argued that the Board's action was a modification of its
certificate, and therefore, under section 401(g) of the FAA, 53 an adjudicatory
hearing was mandatory. The court held that an adjudicatory hearing was not
49 359 F.2d at 626.




52 359 F.2d at 634.
53 72 Stat. 756 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964).
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required, without ever determining or stating whether it considered the
Board's action to be a modification of American's certificate. The court
avoided this determination by positing what amounts to alternative reasons
for its holding.
The first approach taken by the court is that the Storer doctrine obviates
the necessity for an adjudicatory hearing. In Storer," the Federal Communi-
cations Commission adopted a rule limiting the number of television, AM
radio, and FM radio station licenses that might be held by any one person.
Storer, who already held the maximum number of station licenses, applied
for an additional license. The Federal Communications Act required that
license applicants receive an adjudicatory hearing before their applications
might be denied." The Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the
FCC to formulate a rule which establishes standards for applicants and to
summarily reject any application which does not meet these standards, and
therefore Storer was not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing. The holding in
Storer has become the Storer doctrine, and was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in FPC v. Texaco, Inc." There the Court upheld a summary rejection
by the Federal Power Commission of a certificate application which con-
tained pricing contracts previously categorized by the FPC as impermissible.
The Court noted that rulemaking may be used to particularize statutory
standards.
The circuit court applied Storer to the facts of the present case, but did
not indicate what standards the Board had particularized by Policy State-
ment 24. Since rejection of a tariff is never an appropriate remedy unless the
tariff violates the Board's procedural regulations under section 403, 67 and
since Policy Statement 24 is not an addition to those regulations, it is difficult
to see how Storer can permit the Board to reject a tariff. Storer would permit
the Board to particularize the statutory standards of section 1002 (d)" and
thereby obviate the necessity for a hearing in a rate replacement action, but
the Board did not treat its action as a rate replacement action. The Storer
doctrine can support the Board's action only if Policy Statement 24 partic-
ularizes the statutory standards which the Board will apply in selecting car-
riers to offer blocked space service. Thus, the Storer doctrine cannot apply
unless the Board's action is a modification of American's certificate.
The cases so far decided under the Storer doctrine have not concerned
modification of existing certificates, only initial applications. Unless the con-
gressional policy reflected in the grant of adjudicatory hearings to carriers in
modification proceedings is comparable to the policy underlying the grant of
adjudicatory hearings to license applicants, Storer should not apply auto-
matically. Rather, some attempt should be made to justify the extension of
the doctrine in terms of such a different congressional policy, or Storer should
not apply at all. Although the court disposed of the distinction between
64 Supra note 45.
55 48 Stat. 1085 (1934).
66 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
57 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 403, 72 Stat. 158, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1373
(1964).
58 72 Stat. 789 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1964).
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modifications and initial applications as "fortuitous circumstances," 59 it
implicitly recognized the validity of the argument in the following passage:
[The Storer doctrine] rests on a fundamental awareness that rule
making is a vital part of the administrative process, particularly
adapted to and needful for sound evolution of policy in guiding the
future development of industries subject to intensive administrative
regulation in the public interest, and that such rule making is not to
be shackled, in the absence of clear and specific Congressional re-
quirement, by importation of formalities developed for the adjudi-
catory process and basically unsuited for policy rule making. 6°
If, indeed, the congressional requirement for adjudicatory hearings in modifi-
cation proceedings is clear and specific, then the Storer doctrine should not
apply.
American argued that the Supreme Court, in CAB v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.," recognized a strong congressional desire to provide "security of certifi-
cate," and this indicated that the purpose of providing air carriers with
adjudicatory hearings in modification proceedings was not the same as the
purpose in application proceedings, where Congress was motivated simply by
a desire to be fair to all applicants. The court, however, did not read Delta
as indicating such a different purpose. The court said:
Since the Supreme Court gave no indication in Delta that it intended
to depart from the Storer doctrine, we see no basis for reading
Delta as implying that the mere fact that licenses will be affected
renders general rule making an impermissible means of agency action
governing all carriers, or an appropriate general class of carriers.° 2
This is an inadequate dismissal of American's Delta contentions. That the
Supreme Court gave no indication in Delta that it intended to depart from
the Storer doctrine is not surprising, for the issues involved in Delta were not
Storer issues.
In Delta, the Board had issued a certificate to one carrier permitting
limited competition with a local carrier over certain routes as part of the
certificated authority. This permission was granted subject to reconsideration
by the Board. Before the Board's reconsideration, the certificate originally
granted became effective. The Board then sought to modify the certificate by
striking the permission to compete with the local carrier. Even though the
record upon which the certificate had been granted was still fresh, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Board must hold an adjudicatory hearing be-
fore modifying the outstanding certificate. This ruling was governed in part
by the Court's awareness that "Congress was vitally concerned with what has
been called 'security of route'—i.e., providing assurance to the carrier that its
investment in operations would be protected insofar as reasonably possible."° 3
59 359 F.2d at 629.
60 Ibid.
61 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
62 359 F.2d at 631.
03 367 U.S. at 324.
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Delta did not involve the formulation of a rule which particularized industry-
wide standards, but the modification of certificated authority based on a
record and findings recently made; yet an adjudicatory hearing was required.
The circuit court stated in the American case that "security of certifi-
cate" is not disrupted since the Board's policy applies equally to all combina-
tion carriers. This assertion overlooks the fact that, as far as freight service is
concerned, Slick and American are direct competitors, and it matters little to
American that other combination carriers are similarly affected by the
Board's policy. It is submitted that the congressional policy recognized by the
Supreme Court in Delta indicates a larger purpose in the granting of adjudica-
tory hearings to carriers in modification proceedings than in applications. Since
the stake a license holder has in the continuation of his license will usually be
greater than the stake an applicant for a license has in the possibility or
probability of being granted the license, the congressional policy favoring
protection of investment will be disserved by applying Storer to certificate
modification proceedings.
In the instant case, the court's alternative reason for holding that an
adjudicatory hearing was not required is set out in the following passage:
The regulation under discussion [Policy Statement 241, being
an "agency statement of general * * * applicability and future effect
designed to implement * * * or prescribe law or policy," plainly
satisfies the definition of "rule" in § 2(c) of the APA, as well as
general understanding. There is therefore a presumptive procedural
validity for the rulemaking procedure prescribed in § 4 of the APA,
unless countermanded by a different Congressional mandate.° 4
This reasoning is founded on a misreading of section 2 of the APA." Under
section 2, adjudication is agency action other than rulemaking but including
licensing. This indicates that although Congress recognized that both licensing
and rulemaking are of future effect and may prescribe law or policy, Congress
distinguished licensing from rulemaking and required licensing to be accom-
panied by adjudicatory procedures. It is submitted that since the Board's
action could be effective only if American's license were modified in an appro-
priate adjudicatory proceeding, the action taken had to be APA "licensing"
and not, as the court held, APA "rule making."
84 339 F.2d at 630.
65 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.	 1001 (1964). The pertinent portion
of this section is set out below:
(c) RULE AND RULE MAKING.—"Rule" means the whole or any part of any
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . . "Rule making" means
agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(d) ORDER AND ADJUDICATION.—"Order" means the whole or any part of the
final disposition . . . of any agency in any matter other than rule making but
including licensing.
(e) LICENSE AND LicEbrsENG.—"License" includes the whole or part of any
agency permit, certificate . . . or other form of permission. "Licensing" includes
agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, an-




The court offered no support for its holding except to point out that the
alternative "results in even more rigorous procedural requirements than apply
to initial licensing." 66
 This statement, paradoxically, lends support to the
contention that Congress was following a stronger policy in providing hearings
for certificate modification than in providing hearings for certificate applica-
tions.
Underlying the court's refusal to require adjudicatory hearings in the
present case is a policy favoring administrative flexibility. The court does not
wish to force upon an agency time-consuming procedures which are unsuited
for the resolution of questions before it. Flexibility in administrative
procedures is certainly important, but it should not be achieved at the
expense of dearly articulated congressional requirements.
The dissent did not concern itself with the issues of whether the Board
has power to effectuate its blocked space policy, or whether the Board cor-
rectly followed rulemaking procedures. The dissent stated that the Board's
action is discriminatory, suggested that the Board may not have had the
power to so act, and largely confined its discussion to the applicability of
the Storer doctrine.
The dissent contended that the Board's action was a modification of
American's outstanding certificate, and made three points in finding Storer
not applicable to the case: (1) the Storer doctrine cases dealt with agencies
other than the CAB; (2) the cases all involved initial applications for
licenses; and (3) the regulations in the cases were nondiscriminatory, as op-
posed to the Board's regulation in the present case. These attempts to dis-
tinguish Storer are not convincing, because the dissent did not invoke the
crucial test, namely, whether the congressional policy underlying the grant of
an adjudicatory hearing is comparable from one situation to another.
Storer should not apply to the instant case, the dissent argued, because
the Board's policy does not apply "across the board" to all carriers, as it did
in Storer and Texaco. This argument is invalid if the Board properly classified
the carriers, for the Board's policy would then apply "across the board" to all
combination carriers.
The dissent contended that an adjudicatory hearing was the proper
procedure for the resolution of the issues presented in this case:
While the question whether reduced rate "blocked space" ser-
vice may be offered by any carrier might well be appropriate for
rulemaking, the selection of particular carriers to provide such
service is dearly the sort of question which can be resolved properly
and fairly only in an adjudicatory proceeding. Once the Board had
decided that it should not allow every freight carrier to offer such
service, it was faced with the problem of picking and choosing
among competing, mutually exclusive applications. Cf. Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 . . . (1945). 67
00 359 F.2d at 630-31.
67 Id. at 637.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION-REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT
American and the other combination carriers have petitioned the Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari." The Supreme Court has not yet acted
on the petition.
The petition brings before the Supreme Court issues of basic importance
to many federal agencies and the industries which they regulate. The authority
given the CAB to regulate the air transport industry is analogous to the
authority of the FCC over the broadcasting industry," of the FPC over
natural gas and power companies," and of the ICC over surface transporta-
tion.71 These agencies have broadly similar duties to license or issue certifi-
cates,72 and have authority to prescribe rates and otherwise regulate the
tariffs of licensees. 73
The court of appeals decision greatly expands the powers of the CAB.
The conclusion that the Board has power to effectuate its blocked space
policy denies that section 1002 of the FAA74 places any limits on the Board.
This is contra to past practice and obviates the statutory scheme for rate-
regulating which Congress has adopted, with minor variations, for regulatory
agencies. This scheme may be summarized as follows: the participants in the
industry are free, within broad limits, to establish competitively their own
rates; they are, however, required to file tariffs with the agency, and in filing
they are required to observe appropriate agency regulations concerning man-
ner of filing; once they have filed a tariff they are required to follow it. The
agency may investigate tariffs that are in effect and, if it finds them to be
unfair or prejudicial, may prescribe a replacement rate which will meet the
68 35 U.S.L. Week 3037 (U.S. June 6, 1966) (No. 304).
69 See Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
609 (1964).
70 See Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c
(1964); Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717a-w (1964).
71 See Interstate Commerce Act Part I, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1-27 (1964); Interstate Commerce Act Part II, added by 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964); Interstate Commerce Act Part III, added by 54
Stat. 929 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1964), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 912a (Supp. I, 1965).
72 Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 754, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371 (1964), with Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1075, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
I§ 214, 307-12, 316 (1964), and Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1065 (1920), as amended,
16 U.S.C. §§ 797-804, 806 (1964), and Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 717b, f (1964), and Interstate Commerce Act Part I, 24 Stat. 379 (1887),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), and Interstate Commerce Act Part II, 49 Stat. 544
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 303, 306-12 (1964), and Interstate Commerce Act
Part III, 54 Stat. 941 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 909-13 (1964), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 912a (Supp. I, 1965).
73 Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 758, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1373,
1374, 1482 (1964), with Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1070, as amended, 47
U.S.C. §§ 201-05 (1964), and Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 851 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, e
(1964), and Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, d
(1964), and Interstate Commerce Act Part I, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1(4), (5), 15(1), (3), (6), (7) (1964), and Interstate Commerce Act Part II, 49 Stat.
558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 316-18 (1964), and Interstate Commerce Act
Part III, 54 Stat. 934 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 905-07 (1964).
74 72 Stat. 788 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964).
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standards for rates. When a carrier files a change in tariff, the agency may
suspend the new tariff and hold hearings to determine if the change violates
the rate standards. Under this scheme the agency must either allow the new
tariff to become effective, or make a finding that the change violates govern-
ing standards."
The court of appeals decision also permits agencies to modify existing
certificate authority without holding an adjudicatory hearing if the modifica-
tion is the result of rulemaking and has general effect either for the entire
industry or for a properly distinguishable section of the industry. Such a
result is good if, and only if, some test can be established to determine what
constitutes a properly distinguishable section of an industry for these pur-
poses. The court recognizes no limitation on the power to classify except that
the classification must be meaningful, or based on rational foundations.
Where the effect of the classification will be to modify certificates or to
realign competition a stricter requirement is essential.
Application of the Storer doctrine to certificate modifications should be
limited by the principle enunciated in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC."
Whenever an agency is faced with picking and choosing among competitors,
adjudicatory hearings are most appropriate, and should still be required. This
is as true in limiting certificate authority as in deciding whether to issue it
initially. The concept of "security of certificate" would be effectively de-
stroyed unless the authority of agencies to modify certificates is limited by
this procedural requirement. Otherwise agencies will be limited only by their
ability to discover "meaningful" systems of classification within the industry
being regulated. For example, the CAB might deny combination carriers the
authority to carry cargo in all-cargo aircraft, limiting their authority to
carry freight to excess capacity in passenger aircraft. Under the court of
appeals decision this could be accomplished without adjudicatory hearings.
Finally, the decision in the instant case weakens the procedural safe-
guards of the rulemaking process, since important agency action is allowed to
become effective without providing for explicit notice of the subject matter of
the proposed rule or for public notice of the proposed rule's contents. The
Board's final policy on blocked space was never presented until it became
effective. Interested parties were deprived of full opportunity to comment
on the exclusionary nature of the ultimate policy. All-cargo carriers do not
serve all the markets served by combination carriers. Lack of full public
notice, therefore, meant that potential shippers in those areas were unable
to oppose the formulation of a policy which would deprive them of attractive
air freight rates for large volume shipment on a regular basis.
The decision of the court of appeals is fundamentally unsound. The
court ignored the basic question of the Board's rate-regulating function, an
analysis of which leads to the conclusion that the Board could not implement
blocked space tariffs on an exclusionary basis. The court glosses over the
75 Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1953), petition for
cert. dismissed, 345 U.S. 988 (1953).
76 326 U.S. 327 (1945). The Ashbacker principle is that "where two bona fide
applications are mutually exclusive the grant of one without a hearing to both deprives
the loser of the opportunity which Congress chose to give him." Id. at 333.
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question of the Board's power to classify carriers. It did not examine the
procedures followed by the Board in issuing Policy Statement 24, and it
misread section 2 of the APA. The court extended the Storer doctrine to
include certificate modification proceedings without examining the policy
underlying the grant of adjudicatory hearings in such proceedings and, there-
fore, did not recognize that it was extending the doctrine. Because it did not
recognize that the Storer doctrine was being extended, the court did not
articulate what limits it would place on the power of agencies to modify
certificates without bolding adjudicatory hearings.
The dissent does not adequately present the opposing argument to the
court's Storer position, but it does question the appropriateness of rulemaking
for deciding the issues raised by the present case. Neither opinion fastens on
the rate-regulating questions and so this fundamental question is almost
obscured.
It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will grant American's petition
for certiorari, because the questions involved are of basic importance to the
administrative process. Even if the Board does have power to adopt its
exclusionary blocked space policy, there are important grounds for reversal in
the failure of the Board to observe rulemaking procedures. If the Storer
doctrine is to be extended, some limitations are necessary. Where the effect of
the modification is to grant authority to one or more of all carriers able and
willing to offer the service, the Ashbacker principle offers a sound basis for
limitation. In this way the flexibility of rulemaking will be incorporated into
the safeguards of adjudication which are so vital to carriers with large invest-
ments in their certificated operations.
WILLIAM F. M. HICKS
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